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174 abstract
This paper investigates fiscal multipliers in Croatia in the period 1996Q1-2011Q4. 
For this purpose, a Blanchard Perotti three variable baseline SVAR is employed 
as a no regime-switch model, along with a four variable baseline STVAR as a re-
gime-switch model. Results show that during recessions fiscal multipliers in Cro-
atia tend to be much larger and move in line with Keynesian assumptions, i.e. a 
positive government spending shock increases output, private consumption and 
private investment, while oppositely a positive tax shock worsens the same macro-
economic variables. Moreover, during recession times government spending for 
purchases of goods and services seems to be the most effective fiscal instrument 
for boosting economic activity. 
Keywords: fiscal multiplier, spending shock, tax shock, SVAR, STVAR, Croatia
“Our area of ignorance even on basic signs of fiscal policy multipliers is too   
great.”
Perotti (2000:24)
1 introduction
The recent global financial crisis refocused the attention of policy makers and 
economists onto fiscal policy as a potentially strong tool in stimulating economic 
growth. Although for decades there has been a global tendency for fiscal stabiliza­
tion to be performed mainly by the work of automatic stabilizers rather than di­
scretionary fiscal policy, governments as well as institutions traditionally seen as 
symbols of fiscal austerity (such as the International Monetary Fund or European 
Commission) opted for large fiscal stimuli during the latest economic downturn.
Still, the eventual effects of a stimulus package are uncertain and empirical rese­
arch shows no absolute consensus on the effects of fiscal policy on macroecono­
mics. Most studies prove a positive multiplier for an exogenous government spen­
ding shock and a negative multiplier for an exogenous government tax shock. 
Nevertheless, the size (and sign) of a fiscal multiplier is country-, time-, estima­
tion method- and regime-dependent. A revealing example of how differences in 
size of a fiscal multiplier affect potential fiscal stimuli effectiveness was recently 
provided by Barro (2009). In an article for the Wall Street Journal Barro discusses 
the recovery program proposed by Cristina Romer, Chair of President Obama’s 
Council of Economic Advisers. Namely, when estimating the overall job gains for 
the proposed 787 billion USD stimulus package, Cristina Romer used 1.5 as the 
size of the government spending multiplier. Barro’s opinion was that the size of 
this multiplier was essentially zero and therefore, as pointed by Ilzetzki, Mendoza 
and Vegh (2010:2) ‟the difference between Romer’s and Barro’s views of the 
world amounts to a staggering 3.7 million jobs by the end of 2010”.a
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175 Diverging predictions of the effectiveness of fiscal stimuli can be found in theore­
tical literature as well. Real Business Cycle (RBC) models assume that an incr-
ease in government consumption will be completely neutralized by the reduction 
of  private  consumption  (Baxter  and  King,  1993  or  Fatás  and  Mihov,  2001). 
Keynesian models argue that a government consumption increase leads to an in­
crease in private consumption and output (Blanchard, 2003)1. However, Pappa 
(2003:2) indicates that differences in predicting fiscal policy effects arise because 
fiscal shocks are difficult to identify in practice due to ‟endogeneity of fiscal va­
riables, interactions between fiscal and monetary policy variables, delays between 
planning, approval and implementation of fiscal policies and scarceness of reaso­
nable zero-identifying restrictions”. 
This paper studies fiscal multipliers in Croatia using two different frameworks for 
estimation. On one hand a linear structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model 
as proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) is used to estimate the overall sign 
and size of a government spending and tax shock on output, private consumption 
and private investment. The novelty of the SVAR model in this paper with respect 
to other works published in the field of fiscal policy on the Croatian case (i.e. 
Ravnik and Žilić, 2011; Šimović and Deskar-Škrbić, 2013) are the following: (1) 
the data set is based on a longer time span (1996Q1-2011Q4), (2) estimated mul­
tipliers involve not only the effect of total government spending and taxes but 
government spending components as well, (3) fiscal policy effects are investiga­
ted not only with respect to output, but also with respect to private consumption 
and private investment, and (4) multipliers are converted into monetary values (in 
kuna), which is much more friendly for readers and gives a real feeling of the ef­
fect.
On the other hand a smooth transition vector autoregression (STVAR) model is 
used to investigate whether the size of a fiscal multiplier is different in good and 
bad times. This analysis as well embraces the effects (multipliers) of different 
government spending components on output, private consumption and investment.
The main results are in line with Keynesian theory. A spending shock positively 
affects output, private consumption and private investment and the response is 
significant within a year. Moreover, when investigating the effect of government 
consumption versus government investment, the positive effect of the first with 
respect to output and private consumption is persistent and significant throughout 
the whole time horizon. A tax shock leads to a drop in output, private consumption 
and private investment. If the regime-switching models are considered, the results 
are conclusive in the fact that fiscal multipliers tend to be larger in times of econo­
mic downturn in Croatia than in times of expansion when they are mostly insigni­
1 The disagreement about fiscal policy effects on private consumption is part of a broader topic whether con­
sumers are set as Ricardian or non-Ricardian. In the standard neoclassical model an increase in government 
spending tends to crowd out private consumption due to the negative wealth effect on consumer induced by 
expectations of higher tax payments in future.a
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176 ficant. Such results are in line with similar research conducted in the case of other 
(developed and developing) countries.
This paper is structured as follow: section two gives some insight into the theore­
tical and empirical background about fiscal multipliers. The third section is devo­
ted to a brief explanation of the methodologies and data used in the analysis. 
Section four presents the results, while the last, fifth, section is reserved for con­
cluding remarks. 
2 theoretical and empirical background 
In general, a fiscal multiplier refers to a change in output ΔY occurring after an 
exogenous one-unit change in a fiscal policy instrument ΔFI (the fiscal instrument 
FI can be represented by total government spending G, total taxes T or their sub­
component – transfers Gtr or direct taxes Td for instance). For example, in the case 
in which a one-kuna increase in government spending in Croatia causes a 50 lipa 
increase in GDP, then the government spending multiplier is said to be 0.5. Such 
a multiplicative effect varies across the time horizon, so it is important to stress the 
following definitions:
The impact multiplier measures the ratio of a contemporaneous change in output 
to an exogenous change in fiscal policy instrument at time of impact (occurrence 
of shock), i.e. time t0:  
  (1)
The multiplier in a future period n is the ratio of change in output in time t0+n to 
an exogenous change in the fiscal policy instrument at time of impact t0:
  (2)
The cumulative multiplier is defined as the cumulative change in output over the 
cumulative change in fiscal policy instrument at some time horizon n: 
 where i=1,2,…,n  (3)
The peak multiplier represents the largest change in output after a change in fi­
scal policy instrument over any time horizon n:
  (4)
Empirical and theoretical studies show that fiscal multipliers vary in sign and size, 
being also country-, time-, methodology- and economic conditions-specific. In 
fact, there is no absolute consensus on the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomics,   a
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177 and empirical results agree on one fact only, i.e. that a positive government spen-
ding shock has a positive (and significant) effect on output2. 
Additionally, Spilimbergo, Symansky and Schindler (2009:2) point out that the 
size of the multiplier is larger if (1) “leakages” are few (i.e. only a small part of the 
stimulus is saved or spent on imports), (2) monetary conditions are accommodati­
ve (i.e. the interest rate does not increase as a consequence of fiscal expansion), 
and (3) a country’s fiscal position after the stimulus is sustainable. More  over, the­
se authors signal that the degree of financial market development and intermedia­
tion, as well as institutional features and the general macroeconomic and financial 
conditions in the domestic economy and externally, also have influence on the size 
and sign of a fiscal multiplier3. 
Although there was a predominant view that fiscal policy should mainly operate 
through the work of automatic stabilizers, the latest economic crisis showed that a 
growing number of governments opted for discretionarism to boost economic ac­
tivity4. Therefore, fiscal policy is at the focus of academic and policy makers’ de­
bates concerning the question: what is the transmission of fiscal policy shocks? 
Especially in the case of an economic downturn, policymakers should be able to 
predict how a discretionary change in a fiscal instrument (or a set of instruments) 
will affect economic activity, in order to be as efficient and effective as possible in 
smoothing business cycles. 
As already mentioned, among others, the answer is conditioned by the methodo­
logy used in identifying fiscal shocks and by the employed identification restric­
tions. Still, much of the empirical research in this area is based on two methodo­
logies: (1) linear structural vector autoregression (SVAR) models and (2) lineari­
zed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models5,6. Although frequen­
tly applied, both methodologies have two main shortcomings pinpointed by Par­
ker (2011:6): first, the government spending multiplier is time-invariant and inde­
2 It is important to point out that the agreement about the government spending effect on output is mainly due 
to the fact that much of the literature and research investigates fiscal policy on the basis of US data. Fiscal 
policy transmission mechanism is known to be country-specific (since there are no two identical tax and/or 
fiscal systems on the world) and therefore there are works based on the same country case that do not find 
such unambiguous results as in case of the US. For example, investigation into the case of Germany is not as 
conclusive as in the US case with respect to the size and statistical significance of the effect of government 
spending on output (Höppner, 2001; Perotti, 2005; Marcellino, 2002 and Heppke-Falk et al., 2006).
3  For a detailed explanation of the mentioned determinants see Spilimbergo et al. (2009).
4 Spilimbergo, Symansky and Schindler (2009) point out that countries turned to fiscal policy as their pri­
mary stabilization tool either because of changes in their monetary regime (such as currency board or par­
ticipation in a monetary union) or because financial conditions deteriorated to the point at which monetary 
policy became ineffective.
5 Moreover, the study of fiscal policy effects on economic activity proposes three additional schemes for iden­
tifying fiscal policy shocks: (1) the recursive approach introduced by Sims (1980), (2) the sign-restrictions 
approach developed by Mountford and Uhlig (2005), and (3) the event-study (narrative or  Dummy approach) 
proposed by Ramey and Saphiro (1998) for studying the isolated effects of unexpected increases in government 
spending for defense purposes. 
6 Broad surveys of the literature estimating fiscal multipliers are provided in Parker (2011) and Ramey (2011).a
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178 pendent of the state of the economy, and second, a linear model forces a multiplier 
to be independent of the size of the stimulus. 
The SVAR approach to investigating fiscal multipliers was introduced by Blan­
chard and Perotti (2002) in research on quarterly data about government spending, 
taxes and output in the US. Subsequently, much of the empirical research, inclu­
ding this, when investigating fiscal multipliers has relied on the Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) SVAR method7. Table 1 summarizes selected main findings about 
spending and tax multipliers in developed and developing countries using such a 
methodological framework. 
table 1
SVAR based government spending and net taxes multipliers in selected studies
study sample
spending multiplier Tax multiplier
Short-
term
Medium-
term
Short-
term
Medium-
term
Developed countries
Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002)
US 1947Q1–1997Q4 0.5 0.5 (-0.7,-1.3) (-0.4,-1.3)
Biau and Girard (2007) France 1978Q1–2003Q4 1.9 1.5 ­0.5 -0.8
IMF (2005) Portugal 1995Q3–2004Q4 1.32 1.07 – –
Perotti (2004)
US 1960Q1–1979Q4 1.29 1.4 ­1.41 -23.87
US 1980Q1–2001Q4 0.36 0.28 0.7 1.55
Germany 1960Q1–1974Q4 0.36 0.28 0.29 ­0.05
UK 1963Q1–1979Q4 0.48 0.27 ­0.23 ­0.21
UK 1980Q1–2001Q2 ­0.27 ­0.6 0.43 0.7
Heppke-Falk et al. (2006) Germany 1974Q1–2004Q4 0.62 1.27 no effect no effect
Giordano et al. (2007) Italy 1982Q1–2004Q4 1.2 1.7 0.16 –
De Castro and de Cos 
(2008)
Spain 1980Q1–2004Q4 1.3 1 positive negative
Burriel et al. (2010) Euro area 1981Q1–2007Q4 0.87 0.85 ­0.63 ­0.49
Baum and Koester (2011) Germany 1976Q1–2009Q4 0.62 1.27 ­0.66 ­0.53
De Castro and Fernandez 
(2011)
Spain 1981Q1–2008Q4 0.94 0.55
Developing countries
Lonzano and Rodriguez 
(2009)
Colombia 1980Q1–2007Q4 1.12 1.20 positive –
Mirdala (2009)
Czech R. 2000Q1–2008Q4 positive – no effect –
Slovak R. 2000Q1–2008Q4 positive – positive –
Hungary 2000Q1–2008Q4 positive – negative –
Bulgaria 2000Q1–2008Q4 positive – positive –
Romania 2000Q1–2008Q4 positive – positive –
Poland 2000Q1–2008Q4 positive – no effect –
7 Hebous for instance shows that in investigations of government spending effects, in a total of 42 country cases,   
22 of them employ the Blanchard and Perotti SVAR, 9 the sign restriction approach, 5 the recursive framework 
while the narrative and expectation augmented setups are presented in 4 and 2 cases respectively (2009:13-15). a
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study sample
spending multiplier Tax multiplier
Short-
term
Medium-
term
Short-
term
Medium-
term
Developing countries
Crespo Cuaresma et al.
(2011)
Czech R. 1995Q1–2009Q4 no effect ­0.04 no effect 0.03
Hungary 1995Q1–2009Q4 0.01 0.01 no effect ­0.01
Poland 1995Q1–2009Q4 no effect ­0.02 no effect 0.02
Slovak R. 1996Q1–2009Q4 ­0.01 0.00 ­0.02 ­0.1
Slovenia 1996Q1–2009Q4 ­0.01 ­0.01 0.01 0.02
Jemec, Strojan Kastelec 
and Delakorda (2011)
Slovenia 1995Q1–2010Q4 1.61 no effect -0.38 no effect
Mancellari (2011) Albania 1998Q1–2009Q4 0.36 – 1.4 –
Ravnik and Žilić (2011) Croatia 2001M1–2009M12 negative – positive –
Šimović and Deskar-
Škrbić (2013)*
Croatia 2004Q1–2012Q4 2.18 1.91 ­1.32 -0.81
Notes: Short-term multiplier ranges from time of impact to one year span; medium-term multi-
plier refers to the time span going from one to two years, except in case of Crespo Cuaresma et 
al. (2011) and Mancellari (2011) when it goes to two years, i.e. maximum reported. Tax multi-
pliers in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) are shown as range/interval. 
*In the case of Šimović and Deskar-Škrbić (2013) the results shown refer to multipliers at the 
consolidated general government level.
Source: Author’s systematization.
It is possible to observe from table 1 that fiscal multipliers are highly debatable. In 
developed countries spending multipliers are positive in all cases no matter of the 
time horizon under investigation, except in Perotti (2004) in the case of the United 
Kingdom. Same multipliers in developing countries are mostly positive in the 
short run and above unity in Slovenia (Jemec, Strojan Kastelec and Delakorda, 
2011) and Croatia (Šimović and Deskar-Škrbić, 2013). On the other hand tax mul­
tipliers do not exercise a certain effect on output. It is noticeable that not in all 
cases does an increase in taxes lead to a decrease in output, and moreover the 
magnitude of the effect is quite different in the studied cases.
Recent theoretical and empirical studies emphasize that one of the reasons why 
there is no conclusive evidence of fiscal policy effects may be found in the fact 
that government spending (and tax) multipliers may change over the business 
cycle, i.e. be larger in recessions than in expansions (Christiano, Eichenbaum and 
Rebelo, 2009; Woodford, 2010; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2010a, 2010b, 
among others)8. These findings appear to be in line with Keynesian arguments in 
favor of using discretionary government spending in downturn periods to stimu-
late aggregate demand. Table 2 summarizes the spending and tax multipliers 
  during recessions and expansions in selected studies. Among all it is worth noting 
8 It is important to point out that works in the field of fiscal policy when investigating state-dependent mul­
tipliers employ non-linear approaches, mainly STVAR and TVAR (threshold vector autoregressive) models. 
The main difference is that in a TVAR setup the economy discretely changes from one state to the other, i.e. 
it jumps from regime to regime, while a STVAR model allows such a switch to occur smoothly. Moreover, 
within a STVAR approach all observations are used for the estimation of parameters under both regimes.a
n
a
 
g
r
d
o
v
i
ć
 
g
n
i
p
:
t
h
e
 
p
o
w
e
r
 
o
f
 
f
i
s
c
a
l
 
m
u
l
t
i
p
l
i
e
r
s
 
i
n
 
c
r
o
a
t
i
a
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
t
h
e
o
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
3
8
 
(
2
)
 
1
7
3
-
2
1
9
 
(
2
0
1
4
)
180 that the highest negative short-term effect on output after a positive tax shock was 
recorded in France, being 1.6 in bad times and 0.7 in good times (Baum, Po­
plawski-Ribeiro and Weber, 2012), while a positive government spending shock 
in bad times mostly increases output in the short term in the euro area and the US 
(Batini, Callegari and Melina, 2012) with a multiplier of 2.6 and 2.2, respectively.
table 2
Government spending and net taxes multipliers in non-linear approaches in   
selected studies
study sample
spending multiplier Tax multiplier
Short-
term 
Medium-
term
Short-
term
Medium-
term
Developed countries
Baum, Poplawski-
Ribeiro and Weber 
(2012)
Canada 1966Q1–2011Q2
R: ­2.7
E: -0.8
R: ­3.3
E: ­1.1
R: ­0.2
E:  0.2
R: ­0.2
E:  0.2
France 1970Q4–2010Q4
R: ­0.7
E:  1.7
R: ­1.1
E:  2.1
R: ­1.6
E: ­0.7
R: ­2.2
E: ­0.9
Germany 1975Q3–2009Q4
R:  1.0
E:  0.4
R:  1.3
E:  0.4
R: ­0.5
E: ­0.6
R: ­0.6
E: -0.8
Japan 1970Q1–2011Q2
R:  1.6
E:  0.9
R:  1.8
E:  1.3
R:  0.2
E:  0.6
R: ­0.2
E:  0.4
UK 1970Q1–2011Q2
R: ­0.1
E:  0.1
R: ­0.1
E:  0.1
R:  0.1
E:  0.0
R:  0.1
E: ­0.1
US 1965Q2–2011Q2
R:  1.9
E:  1.6
R:  2.4
E:  2.4
R: ­0.2
E: ­0.4
R: ­0.3
E: ­0.5
Batini, Callegari  
and Melina (2012)
US 1975Q1–2010Q2
R:  2.2
E:  0.3
R:  2.2
E: ­0.5
R:  0.2
E:  0.2
R:  0.7
E:  0.7
Japan 1981Q1–2009Q4
R:  2.0
E:  1.4
R:  2.0
E:  1.1
R: ­0.2
E: ­0.3
R:  0.2
E: ­0.1
France 1970Q1–2010Q4
R:  2.1
E:  1.6
R:  1.8
E:  1.9
R:  0.0
E: ­0.1
R: ­0.3
E: ­0.2
Italy 1981Q1–2007Q4
R:  1.6
E:  0.4
R:  1.8
E:  0.5
R:  0.2
E:  0.1
R:  0.2
E:  0.1
Euro area 1985Q1–2009Q4
R:  2.6
E:  0.4
R:  2.5
E:  0.1
R:  0.4
E: ­0.2
R:  0.4
E: ­0.1
Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko 
(2010a)
US 1947Q1–2008Q4
R:  1.4
E:  0.0
R:  1.8
E: ­0.1
– –
Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko 
(2010b)
OECD 1985–2010*
R:  0.5
E: ­0.3
R:  0.4
E: ­0.3
– –
Notes: Short-term multiplier ranges from time of impact to one-year span; medium-term multi-
plier refers to a time span of from one to two years. R stands for recession, while E for expansion. 
*In case of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010b) the dataset is based on semiannual data with a 
time span from 1985 to 2010 for “old” OECD members and from 1990 to 2010 for the ‟newer” 
OECD members.
Source: Author’s systematization.a
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181 Moreover, Romer and Berstein (2009) estimate that a spending multiplier during 
the latest global financial crisis in US is at least 3. Similarly, Christiano, Ei­
chenbaum and Rebelo (2009), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010a, 2010b) and 
Bachmann and Sims (2012) find that spending multipliers on output and private 
consumption in US tend to rise during periods of economic downturns (up to the 
size of 3) while they are around zero during expansions. Empirical studies show 
that output multipliers of government consumption are larger in recessions, but 
they are even larger when monetary policy is highly accommodative, as in the 
case of the recent financial crisis when the monetary policy rate of most central 
banks was at its lower bound level. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009) 
and Woodford (2010) show that when interest rates are at their effective low level, 
fiscal shocks tend to have amplified effects because government spending does 
not crowd out private spending, with multipliers as large as 10.
Most papers that investigate fiscal multipliers in special times focus on the case of 
developed countries (mainly the US), while there is almost no evidence that the 
same conclusion holds in the case of developing/emerging countries. In the latter 
fiscal policy often tends to be overwhelmingly procyclical, partly because of poli­
tical incentives for governments to spend more generously and thus run large de­
ficits in good times (for example, Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2004; and Alesi­
na, Campante and Tabellini, 2008). If this is the case then fiscal actions should be 
less effective irrespective of whether the economic times are good or bad.
3 data and methodology
The empirical analysis of fiscal multipliers in this paper is based on two methodo­
logies. On one hand the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) SVAR setup is chosen from 
the set of linear approaches, while on the other hand, in order to investigate whe­
ther fiscal multipliers differ in Croatia in good and bad times, the smooth transi­
tion vector autoregression (STVAR) is applied, as in Auerbach and Gorodni­
chenko (2010b).
3.1 the svar specification 
The baseline specification includes three variables: the log of real government 
spending gt, the log of real output yt and the log of real government revenue rt (“net 
taxes” or “taxes” for short). Denoting the vector of endogenous variables by Xt 
and the vector of reduced form innovations by Ut, the reduced form VAR model 
can be written as:
,  (5)
where  , C(L) is a   autoregressive lag polynomial matrix and 
9
. 
9 Reduced form residuals Ut represent a linear combination of different structural innovations and therefore 
have no economic interpretation. a
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182 The reduced form residuals  and  can be thought of as a linear combination 
of three components (Perotti, 2004:3): (1) the automatic response of taxes and 
government spending to innovations in output, (2) the systematic discretionary 
response of policymakers to output, and (3) the random discretionary shocks to 
fiscal policy. The latter encompasses the structural fiscal shocks, which unlike the 
reduced form residuals are uncorrelated among each other. 
Defining  the  vector  of  spending,  output  and  tax  structural  shocks  as   
, Ut can be written as a linear combination of structural shocks 
Vt in the following way
,  (6)
where A and B are n x n matrices describing immediate relations between the re­
duced form residuals and the structural shocks10. Therefore, the structural VAR 
can be obtained by multiplying (5) by matrix A and using (6), which leads to the 
following:
  (7)
The matrix representation of the latter is:
  (8)
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) argue that governments cannot react within the same 
quarter to changes of the macroeconomic setting mainly because fiscal policy 
decisions involve many agents (parliament, government and society) and there-
fore need a long period of time for implementation. Hence the systematic discre-
tionary response is absent in quarterly data. Therefore the reduced-form fiscal 
shocks capture only the automatic response of fiscal variables to economic acti-
vity (meaning that  ). 
Without loss of generality, one can write:
,  (9)
  , and  (10)
,  (11)
10 In such a set up A and B are n x n parameter matrices that require identifying restrictions to be imposed on 
A and B to obtain an unique relation, because reduced form residuals have no economic interpretation and 
different structural forms can give the same reduced form VAR model (see for instance Gottshalk, 2001).a
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183 where the  s capture the other two components and  and   are the structural 
fiscal shocks. 
When this is the case, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use available exogenous in­
formation on the elasticity of spending and taxes with respect to GDP to compute 
the appropriate value of the coefficients  . These elasticities allow fiscal shocks 
to be constructed in cyclically adjusted terms as follows:
, and   (12)
.  (13)
As mentioned earlier, this study assumes that expenditure does not respond to 
output within a quarter because it is predetermined in a budgetary plan and there­
fore not elastic in the short run. Thus,  is set to zero according to the assumption 
that government spending is solely under the control of the fiscal authority. How-
ever, worth noting is that some recent studies challenge this assumption. Among 
others, Rodden and Wibbles (2010) find evidence of spending elasticity of 0.17 
with respect to output at the state and local level in the US. However, this work 
(like others in this field) is based on annual data, so it is reasonable to assume that 
such a procyclicality vanishes in quarterly frequencies. 
In line with Blanchard and Perotti (2002) the coefficient   is estimated as the 
weighted average of different revenue components’ output elasticity. The output 
elasticity of net taxes is 0.92 in the Croatian case (see appendix B for a detailed 
view about the estimations of exogenous elasticities), meaning that a 1% increase 
in output (GDP) generates a 0.92% increase in taxes. This estimation is in line 
with results obtained by studies covering other countries. It matches the tax elasti­
city with respect to output in the German case shown in Perotti (2002) but is lower 
than that in the US or Canada for example. If it is compared to the tax elasticity 
obtained in the Croatian case by Ravnik and Žilić (2011) it is 0.03 percentage 
point lower and not significantly different.
The recovered cyclically adjusted reduced form fiscal shocks represent a linear 
combination of the two structural fiscal policy shocks, i.e.  
, and  (14)
.  (15)
Assuming that a government tends to decide on expenditure first means that   
, and therefore:
, while   (16)a
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184 ,  (17)
where   is estimated by OLS to retrieve the structural shocks to the fiscal varia­
bles.
The two estimated structural shocks are orthogonal to the structural shock of ou­
tput and therefore can be used as instruments when estimating equation (10) using 
the instrumental variables approach. 
So the just-identified three variable baseline SVAR model is the following11:
  (18)
where OLS is adopted in estimating   and IV in estimating  and  . The esti­
mates are presented in the following table.
table 3
Estimated contemporaneous coefficients in the baseline SVAR model
 
ols
 
IV
 
IV
Coefficient ­0.079 0.018 ­0.3537
(Standard errors) (-1.277) (0.048) (0.125)
[P-value] [0.207] [0.698] [0.005]
Source: Author’s estimation.
The signs of the contemporaneous effects of spending and taxes on output are, as 
expected, positive and negative respectively. Moreover, the correlation between 
cyclically adjusted fiscal shocks results to be very low (-0.14) yielding very low 
estimates of  12. 
Important to notice is that in alternative specifications the baseline model is exten­
ded for a GDP component (private consumption or private investment) to a four 
variable  SVAR,  where  private  consumption  or  investment  in  turn  is  ordered 
third13. Moreover, when investigating the effects of particular government spen­
11   The system needs   restrictions, where n is the number of endogenous variables.
12 The correlation between cyclically adjusted fiscal shocks is very low also in the case when taxes are orde­
red first. Therefore, small values of   and   imply that the choice between ordering spending or taxes first 
does not influence impulse responses and proves the robustness of the results. 
13 This order follows the suggestion by Caldara and Kamps (2008), as in the case of the baseline model. For 
a detailed discussion on the assumptions behind such ordering, refer to their work. To recall, placing private 
consumption or private investment in the third place means it does not react contemporaneously to taxes, but 
is contemporaneously affected by government spending and output shocks.a
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185 ding component variable gt is replaced by the component in question in the exten­
ded four variable VAR14,15.
3.2. the stvar specification 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010a) extend the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
setup by allowing for responses differentiated across recessions and expansions in 
a regime switching vector autoregression framework, where transitions across sta­
tes occur smoothly. The main advantage of the STVAR over the SVAR is that it 
effectively utilizes more information by exploiting variations in the degree to 
which the economy is in a particular regime (i.e. recession or expansion) so that 
estimation and inference for each regime is based on a larger set of observations 
(Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2010a:4). Estimating a SVAR for each regime 
separately may seriously limit the amount of observations in a regime, which ma­
kes estimates unstable and imprecise.
According to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010a) the baseline smooth transi­
tion vector autoregression (STVAR) specification is:
,   (19)
where    (20)
  (21)
with  ,    (22)
,    (23)
where Xt is the vector of endogenous variables, ordered again by taking into ac­
count the assumed contemporaneous effects amid variables, ut a normal error 
term, and zt is the indicator of the state of an economy, i.e. an index of the business 
cycle, normalized to have unit variance so that λ remains scalar invariant. A posi­
tive z indicates an expansionary phase, while oppositely a negative z indicates a 
contractionary phase of the business cycle. The matrices Πi and Ωi (where i=R in 
recession and i=E in expansion) represent the coefficients and variance-covari-
ance matrix of disturbances in two regimes that are the system in a sufficiently 
deep  recession  (when )  and  in  a  sufficiently  strong  expansion  (when
). The weights assigned to each regime (expansion and recession) for 
a given weighting function F(.) vary between 0 and 1 according to the contempo­
raneous state of the economy zt16.
14 Specific budget component elasticities to output and/or GDP components are reported in appendix B. 
15 Additional details about alternative models are given in appendix C.
16 Auerbach and Gorodnichenko set z equal to a four- (2010a) and seven- (2010b) quarter moving average of 
the real output growth rate. a
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186 Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010a), this study employs the four 
quarter moving average of output growth rates as indicator of the state of the eco­
nomy, and lambda is calibrated on the level of 1.5, making the economy spend 20 
percent of the time in recessionary regimes17.
Such a model allows two ways for differences to occur in the propagation of struc­
tural shocks (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2010a:5): (1) contemporaneous via 
differences in covariance matrices for disturbances ΩE and ΩR, and (2) dynamic 
via differences in lag polynomials ΠE(L) and ΠR(L).
In their original work (2010a), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko implement a STVAR 
approach on a US dataset available in high frequencies, and thus are able to carry 
out highly nonlinear estimation for a large number of parameters18. Thus, in their 
following work (2010b, p. 3) such an approach for OECD countries would be very 
challenging due to the short time series with lower frequencies19. 
Given the importance of expectations in identifying fiscal shocks, Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2010b) extend the model and control for expectations by using 
real time forecasts and thus augmenting the equations for the unanticipated com­
ponent of government spending and/or revenue ( , with FI being the fiscal 
instrument under examination). This unanticipated component was not accounted 
for in the SVAR approach; it is newly introduced and measured by the ratio bet-
ween actual spending (or actual revenue) and its forecasted value in one period 
earlier (spending t in time t-1, or revenue t in time t-1)20. Therefore, the first step 
is to estimate the SVAR for  21.
Since this is the case, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010b) modify the aforesaid 
original approach and follow an approach previously advocated by Jorda (2005) 
and Stock and Watson (2007), among others, i.e. rather than estimating the entire 
system of equations in the STVAR and using these to estimate the impulse resp-
onse functions, they estimate the impulse responses directly by projecting a varia­
ble of interest on its own lags and lags of other variables entering the VAR. As 
  pinpointed by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010b:4), this direct projection 
17 See appendix D for a plot of the transition function between regimes of expansions and recessions in the Cro­
atian case. Moreover, it is important to stress that the growth rate data span used in estimating the weighting 
function is longer than the observation period in the models, i.e. it ranges from 1995Q1 to 2013Q1. In that way 
there is no loss of the first observations due to the four-quarter moving average representation. 
18 To inspect in detail the nonlinear estimation approach, see the appendix in Auerbach and Gorodnich  enko 
(2010a).
19 Although the time span of observations in the Croatian case used in this analysis goes back in history as 
much as possible, it can be considered relatively short, not only with respect to the available statistics in the 
case of the US, but also with respect to (older and newer) OECD member states.  
20 To obtain values of the unanticipated component Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010b:3) rely on several 
sources, such as surveys prepared by professional forecasters, projections prepared by governmental or inter­
national agencies, or other credible sources. In the Croatian case the sources and calculation of unanticipated 
components is presented in appendix A.
21 For simplicity of notation the unanticipated component of government spending in the equations is denoted 
by  , which corresponds to the variable defined in appendix A as FEgspend.a
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187   approach provides a flexible estimation method, which does not impose dynamic 
restrictions implicitly embedded in VARs and which can conveniently accommo­
date nonlinearities in the response function.
For example, if the interest is in determining the response of output yt at horizon h 
after  a  government  spending  shock,  bearing  in  mind  the  vector 
, then the estimation equation is: 
  (24) 
with F(zt) as defined in equation (22) and h=0,1,…,H. The unanticipated compo­
nent of government spending ( ) represents the forecast error, i.e. the diffe-
rence between forecasted and actual government spending in time t-1 for period t. 
Thus   can be interpreted as the “surprise government spending shock” (Auer­
bach and Gorodnichenko, 2010b:4).
The lag polynomials ( ) in equa­
tion (24) are used to control for the history of shocks rather than to compute the 
dynamics, while the coefficients in   and   can be interpreted as multipliers 
that show the response of output to a structural shock in government spending in 
expansions and recessions respectively.
A linear equivalent o equation (24) is the following:
,  (25)
where the response of Y is constrained to be the same for all zt’s22.
The estimation method as set in equation (20) has the following main advantages 
(Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2010b:6): (1) it involves only linear estimation if 
the parameter λ is fixed, (2) it allows just the equation related to the variable of 
interest (output, for example) to be estimated, and (3) it does not constrain the 
shape of the impulse response functions, rather than imposing the pattern genera­
ted by the SVAR.
3.3 the data
As  already  mentioned,  the  baseline  dataset  includes  a  quarterly  dataset  from 
1996Q1 to 2011Q4 for output (Yt), government spending (Gt) and government 
revenue (Rt – also referred to as taxes or net taxes in the rest of the paper). Impor­
22 Such a constraint implies that  ,  ,   
and   for all L and h.a
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188 tant to stress is that fiscal variables are defined as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), 
i.e. both net of transfers, and at the consolidated central government level23. All 
variables are in logarithms, real terms (CPI deflated 2000=100) and seasonally 
adjusted using the ARIMA X12 algorithm. 
According to the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test results, all variables pre­
sent unit roots in levels and are stationary in first differences (table 4).
table 4
Augmented Dickey Fuller test values 
H0: The variable has a unit root.
Variable Deterministic 
component
test statistics Variable Deterministic 
component
test statistics
LY c,t -1.8110 ∆LY c,t -9.4757***
c -1.8825 c -9.2081***
LG c,t -0.3815 ∆LG c,t -8.7127***
c ­1.3053 c -8.4404***
LR c,t ­1.1244 ∆LR c,t -7.9141***
c -1.8792 c -7.7397***
Note: Variables’ definition and symbols explained in appendix A; L is used to denote logarithms, 
while ∆ refers to first differences; variables are seasonally adjusted; constant included; maxi-
mum number of lags used is 12. 
* Null hypothesis rejected on 10% level of significance; test statistics’ critical values accor-
ding Davidson and MacKinnon (1993); ** null hypothesis rejected on 5% level of significance;   
*** null hypothesis rejected on 1% level of significance.
Source: Author’s calculation.
Moreover, results show the presence of co-integrating relations and hence a pos­
sible specification of a vector error correction model. But as noted by Heppke-
Falk, Tenhofen and Wolff (2006:12), when estimating models that have many di­
saggregated time series it is difficult to find economically interpretable cointegra­
tion vectors. Moreover, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) find no significant differen­
23 See appendix A for details about all variables used throughout the analysis. Moreover, it is important to 
point out that generally it is common empirical practice to analyze fiscal policy effects using consolidated 
general government data. Still, this paper (as well as others that investigate fiscal policy in Croatia – Bena­
zić, 2006; Rukelj, 2009; Ravnik and Žilić, 2011, among others) bases the empirical part on consolidated cen­
tral government data. It is important to stress that quarterly fiscal data for Croatia at the consolidated gene­
ral government level are not available for the periods prior to the year 2004. Nevertheless, such a limitation 
should not pose significant differences, principally for two reasons: (1) discretionary decisions are carried by 
the central government, and (2) the share of local governments’ budgets in the consolidated general budget 
is on average less than 10% and only 53 Croatian local units (out of a total of 576 – regions, cities and cou-
nties) are concerned. Moreover, Šimović and Deskar-Škrbić (2013) show that fiscal multipliers in Croatia 
differ across different government levels, but this is mainly true for the short-run, while the cumulative mul­
tiplier of government spending across 8 quarters turns out to be 1.80 and 1.91 at the consolidated central and 
general government respectively. The same authors also report that the peak government spending multiplier 
has the size of 1.20 and 1.39 at the consolidated central and the general government, respectively, while the 
lowest spending multiplier is 0.19 irrespective of the consolidation level.a
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189 ces between results obtained with and without taking the cointegrating relation 
into account24.
Although the system is stationary in first differences, the analysis is done using 
variables in levels, because the focus of the analysis is on the dynamics (i.e. im­
pulse responses), not the coefficient estimation25. To choose the appropriate lag 
length the judgment is based on information criteria results, the length of the sam­
ple and economic sense. To be as parsimonious as possible the VAR lag selection 
tests included a maximum of four lags. The Akaike criterion (AIC) and final pre­
diction suggest two lags, while the Schwarz Bayesian (SC) and Hannan-Quinn 
(HQC) criteria indicate one lag as optimal. This analysis will allow for dynamic 
interaction up to one lags as suggested by the Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn criteria. 
Such a choice is based on two assumptions: on one hand a lower lag reduces the 
probability of over fitting the model (because every additional parameter added 
substantially decreases the power of estimation), and on the other hand Lütkepohl 
(2005:326) shows that the Akaike criterion asymptotically overestimates the true 
order with some positive probability.
4 results
 According to the level specification, structural shocks represent as one percentage 
point increase in the policy variables, while impulse responses represent the per­
cent change of the responding variable. Still, all fiscal multipliers shown are ex­
pressed in kuna26. To do so, the estimated multiplier value is multiplied by the 
ratio of the mean of the response variable (in kuna) to the mean of the respective 
impulse variable (in kuna)27. Reported fiscal multipliers for the SVAR approach 
include the impact multiplier, two cumulative multipliers (at the horizon of 12 
quarters and one at 20 quarters) and the peak multiplier, which additionally in 
24 Krusec (2003) employs a SVEC (structural vector error correction) model to account for the cointegrating 
relation(s) and to differentiate between permanent and transitory shocks, when investigating the effects of 
fiscal policy on output in case of four EMU (Austria, Finland, Germany and Italy) and four non-EMU (US, 
Great Britain, Australia and Canada) countries. Still, results show that a government spending shock positi­
vely affects output, while a tax shock leads to a decrease in output, and the size (magnitude) of the effect is 
very similar to those obtained by other works using a SVAR setup.
25 This is common empirical practice. Studies that estimate a SVAR in levels no matter of the stationarity in 
first differences are for instance Perotti (2002), Heppke-Falk, Tenhofen and Wolff (2006), de Castro and de 
Cos (2006), Jemec, Strojan-Kastelec and Delakorda (2011), Ravnik and Žilić (2011). In addition, as demon­
strated by Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) even if the system includes non-stationary variables, the OLS esti­
mators are still consistent when the model is estimated in levels.
26 As mentioned, this Section reports multipliers  monetarized  in kuna, while the impulse response functions 
are presented in appendix E.
27 For example: say that the estimated impact multiplier of government spending on output is 0.15 and the 
ratio of the mean of GDP to the mean of government spending is 2.5, then at impact a one kuna increase in 
government spending leads to an increase in output of 38 lipa (=0.15*2.5). It is important to point that Ramey 
and Zubairy (2013) discuss on the US case how such a procedure in converting percentage changes into dollar 
changes is not precise and leads to higher values of fiscal multipliers. The authors stress that the ratio of the 
mean of output to the mean of government spending on the US case depends upon the time span of the sam­
ple, varying from 2 to 24 in the 1889-2009 sample or from 4-7 in the post WWII sample. Therefore, Ramey 
and Zubairy (2013:9-10) suggest an ex ante conversion of output and government spending to the same units 
using the value of G/Y in each point of time and not averaging. However, such a conversion can be omitted 
in the Croatian case, since the already limited time-span in case of shortening does not lead to significantly 
different ratios of the mean of GDP to the mean of government spending.a
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190 parenthesis shows the quarter in which the peak occurs. For the STVAR, i.e. re-
gime switching and no-regime switching model, average multipliers are reported 
over three horizons (eight, twelve and twenty quarters)28,29. Important to notice is 
that, not only due to different methodological approaches, presented fiscal multi­
pliers may not be directly comparable, but this reporting strategy better highlights 
the differences between obtained regime- and no-regime switching models, which 
is the main point of this paper. The main point of the STVAR is estimating multi­
pliers in the expansionary and recessionary phases of the business cycle. More-
over, in all STVAR specifications a linear representation of the corresponding 
model has been estimated as in equation (25), but these results are not reported 
since there is no case where they significantly differ from those obtained using the 
SVAR.
4.1 baseline model results
Table 5 shows the multiplier effect of government spending and net taxes on ou­
tput in Croatia using the Blanchard and Perotti estimation approach.
No matter the methodological framework, a positive spending shock positively 
affects output, while a positive tax shock negatively affects output in Croatia. 
These findings are in line with those shown in Grdović Gnip (2013) when a five 
variable SVAR Blanchard and Perotti approach is used30. Next, it is possible to 
observe that macroeconomics reacts according to the Keynesian assumption of 
higher multiplier effect in downturn times, the average multiplier being above 2 
and significant, meaning that a one kuna increase in government spending would 
lead to an increase in output of more than 2 kuna in the medium and long term. 
In the SVAR approach output reacts negatively to a tax shock only at impact, 
while in the STVAR setting the reaction follows the same pattern in recession ti­
mes, while in expansion times it results to be negative irrespective of the time 
horizon but also insignificant. Moreover, all multipliers in expansion times are 
insignificant.
28 The average multiplier in recession and expansion is calculated as   and   res­
pectively.
29 Important to point out is that Ramey and Zubairy (2013) as well as Owyang, Ramey and Zubairy (2013) 
provide a detailed discussion about pitfalls in reporting fiscal multipliers in normal and recessionary times. 
In doing so, they focus on the Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010b) direct projection method as the most 
widely implemented during the last years. Owyang, Ramey and Zubairy (2013) point out that Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko̕ s multipliers are overestimated due to their fundamental assumption how a positive shock 
to government spending during a low-growth state does not help the economy escape that state. Moreover, 
they add that the Auerbach and Gorodnichenko assumption about the recession lasting 20 quarters is unreali­
stic since the data provide information about shorter recessionary periods in the US. Above that, the authors 
conclude that spending multipliers calculated as in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010a, 2010b) show the 
response of output after a government spending shock without being rescaled for the effects the same shock 
exercises on the development in government spending. In line with Auerbach and Gorodnichenko this work 
also reports the average multiplier across 8, 12 and 20 periods (quarters), being these the average response of 
output in time t+h (where h equals to 8, 12 or 20) after the initial shock in government spending. 
30 The five-variable SVAR includes prices and interest rates in addition to government spending, output and 
taxes.a
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191 table 5
Fiscal multipliers in the baseline SVAR and STVAR models
Government spending 
multiplier (G)
Tax multiplier  
(R)
sVaR blanchard and Perotti
Impact multiplier 0.33 ­0.03
Cumulative multiplier (h=12) 1.84 0.34
Cumulative multiplier (h=20) 2.66 0.65
Peak multiplier (q) 0.33 (0) 0.04 (8)
stVaR – regime switch: recession
Average multiplier (h=8) 2.12 ­0.02
Average multiplier (h=12) 2.18 0.02
Average multiplier (h=20) 2.21 0.40
STVAR – regime switch: expansion
Average multiplier (h=8) 0.40 -0.02
Average multiplier (h=12) 1.00 -0.02
Average multiplier (h=20) 0.58 -0.03
Note: Numbers in italic mean that the estimate is not significant at the 95% confidence level.
Source: Author’s estimation.
Robustness of the baseline models was checked by means of several alternatives. 
In the case of the SVAR approach the estimation was redone by (i) assuming that 
taxes come first and (ii) using different output elasticity of taxes, i.e. those obtai­
ned by Ravnik and Žilić (2011). In the case of the STVAR approach the robustness 
was checked by (i) replacing the transition variable output growth rates with ou­
tput gap31 and (ii) trying a different calibration of lambda, i.e. 0.8, as calibrated by   
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010a) for the US, plus 3 and 5 to make the tran­
sition between regimes even smoother or more abrupt. 
4.2 alternative models
As mentioned earlier alternative models are extended by one variable, i.e. private 
consumption and private investment in turn, ordered after output and before the 
government revenue (tax) variable. When the effects of different spending compo­
nents  are  analyzed,  then  the  component  under  investigation  replaces  the  go­
vernment spending variable in the extended model. Similarly, when direct and 
indirect tax effects are studied, the net taxes variable is replaced32.
4.2.1 effects on private consumption and private investment
Government spending, as well as a tax shock, exercises a Keynesian effect on 
private consumption. As shown in table 6 a positive government spending shock 
31 HP filtered output gap with λ=1600 and λ=480 (the first is standard for quarterly data, while for the latter 
refer to Bouthevillain et al., 2001).
32 It is important to point out that in the case of an extended SVAR model the equation regarding net taxes 
needs to be adjusted for additional exogenous elasticities, presented in appendix B. a
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192 increases private consumption, while a positive tax shock decreases the same ma­
croeconomic variable.
table 6
Private consumption multipliers to fiscal shocks in the alternative SVAR and 
STVAR models
Government spending 
multiplier (G)
Tax multiplier  
(R)
sVaR blanchard and Perotti
Impact multiplier 0.04 ­0.02
Cumulative multiplier (h=12) 0.73 ­0.29
Cumulative multiplier (h=20) 1.22 ­0.46
Peak multiplier (q) 0.06 (8) -0.02 (0)
stVaR – recession
Average multiplier (h=8) 1.07 -0.08
Average multiplier (h=12) 1.09 0.05
Average multiplier (h=20) 1.02 0.13
STVAR – expansion
Average multiplier (h=8) 0.77 0.04
Average multiplier (h=12) 0.58 0.07
Average multiplier (h=20) 0.35 0.03
Note: Numbers in italic mean that the estimate is not significant at the 95% confidence level.
Source: Author’s estimation.
Moreover, it is possible to observe that the multiplier is much higher (and signifi­
cant) in recession, while fiscal multipliers in expansion times seem to be mostly 
insignificant. According to the SVAR approach a one kuna government spending 
increase will on impact raise private consumption by four lipa, but in the long 
term the effect will reach 1.22 kuna. In contrast, a one kuna increase in taxes will 
on impact decrease private consumption by just two lipa, but in the long term the 
decrement is about 46 lipa.
If the regime-switch model is considered then in downturn times the effect of the 
multiplier is much stronger and has a stronger effect on boosting the economy. 
That is, if during recessions an increase in government spending of one kuna oc­
curs, private consumption will rise by 1.07 kuna on average per quarter during the 
first two years. On the other hand the effect on private investment is meager and 
insignificant (table 7).
It is possible to notice that effects of fiscal policy on private investment are mostly 
significant at impact when a positive spending shock raises private investment and 
a positive tax shock leads to a negative effect on private investment. The multi­
plier effect is thus stronger in recessions than in expansions, the average tax mul­
tiplier not being significant in the medium- and long-term.a
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193 table 7
Private investment multipliers to fiscal shocks in the alternative SVAR and STVAR 
models
Government spending 
multiplier (G)
Tax multiplier  
(R)
sVaR blanchard and Perotti
Impact multiplier 0.05 ­0.03
Cumulative multiplier (h=12) 0.35 ­0.11
Cumulative multiplier (h=20) 0.47 -0.15
Peak multiplier (q) 0.05 (0) 0.0 (10)
stVaR – recession
Average multiplier (h=8) 0.56 ­0.19
Average multiplier (h=12) 0.39 -0.14
Average multiplier (h=20) 0.30 -0.03
STVAR – expansion
Average multiplier (h=8) 0.39 0.15
Average multiplier (h=12) 0.30 0.13
Average multiplier (h=20) 0.20 0.12
Note: Numbers in italic mean that the estimate is not significant at the 95% confidence level.
Source: Author’s estimation.
4.2.2 effect of different spending components
As mentioned in the introductory section a number of countries implemented fi­
scal stimuli packages during the latest financial crisis. In order to investigate what 
spending category would be at most effective in the Croatian case this section 
presents fiscal multipliers with respect to output, private consumption and private 
investment for three main government spending categories, i.e. spending for pur­
chases of goods and services, spending for wages and capital spending.
Table 8 presents multipliers of spending for purchases of goods and services and 
it is noticeable that in the case of a regime-switching model the multipliers are 
higher than in the case of the linear approach. If considering the latter a one kuna 
increase in spending for purchases of goods and services at impact decreases ou­
tput and private consumption by three and one lipa respectively, the effect being 
much larger in three years, i.e. there is increase of 33 and 24 lipa respectively.
On the other hand during recessions the average multiplier is higher in the first 
eight quarters, meaning that a one kuna increase in this spending component will 
raise output, private consumption and private investment by 3.89, 2.16 and 0.61 
kuna respectively. In all these cases the effect is significant. It is interesting that 
the impact of a spending shock in expansionary times is shown to be high but 
statistically insignificant.a
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194 table 8
Government expenditure for purchases of goods and services multipliers in the 
alternative SVAR and STVAR models
output Private 
consumption
Private  
investment
sVaR blanchard and Perotti
Impact multiplier ­0.03 ­0.01 0.01
Cumulative multiplier (h=12) 0.33 0.24 0.06
Cumulative multiplier (h=20) 0.67 0.44 0.09
Peak multiplier (q) 0.04 (10) 0.02 (11) 0.01 (4)
stVaR – recession
Average multiplier (h=8) 3.89 2.16 0.61
Average multiplier (h=12) 3.04 1.73 0.35
Average multiplier (h=20) 2.21 1.27 0.24
STVAR – expansion
Average multiplier (h=8) 4.42 2.65 1.07
Average multiplier (h=12) 3.31 1.89 0.77
Average multiplier (h=20) 2.26 1.16 0.45
Note: Numbers in italic mean that the estimate is not significant at the 95% confidence level.
Source: Author’s estimation.
Spending for wages does not exercise as large an effect on macroeconomic varia­
bles as spending for purchases of goods and services. Table 9 presents the results 
and it is shown that the effect is not significant in most of the cases, for both output 
cumulative multipliers are insignificant, as are one or two average multipliers in 
recession times and all multipliers in expansionary times. Nevertheless, in a linear 
setting, on impact a one kuna increase in spending for wages raises output, pri  vate 
consumption and private investment on impact by four, two and nine lipa respec­
tively. In recessionary times the same impact is 4.04, 2.22 and 0.58 kuna respecti­
vely on average for the first eight quarters. 
A one-kuna increase in capital spending will increase output and private con­
sumption on impact by 47 and 12 lipa respectively. In the medium term the effect 
on output will be more prominent because according to the SVAR approach ou­
tput will increase 1.20 kuna in three years (table 10).
As in the case of other spending components, the effect of a capital spending 
shock is much higher during economic downturns than in expansions when in 
addition it is seen to be insignificant. Although it is expected that a government 
investment will increase private investment, the SVAR approach is not conclusive 
regard this fact, while the multiplier in the case of a recession in the regime-switch 
model is lower than one.a
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195 table 9
Government expenditure for wages multipliers in the alternative SVAR and STVAR 
models
output Private 
consumption
Private  
investment
sVaR blanchard and Perotti
Impact multiplier 0.04 0.02 0.09
Cumulative multiplier (h=12) 0.01 0.01 0.31
Cumulative multiplier (h=20) -0.06 -0.05 0.31
Peak multiplier (q) 0.04 (0) 0.02 (0) 0.09 (0)
stVaR – recession
Average multiplier (h=8) 4.04 2.22 0.58
Average multiplier (h=12) 3.29 1.71 0.37
Average multiplier (h=20) 2.26 1.20 0.17
STVAR – expansion
Average multiplier (h=8) 1.68 0.94 0.47
Average multiplier (h=12) 1.26 0.70 0.35
Average multiplier (h=20) 0.78 0.40 0.20
Note: Numbers in italic mean that the estimate is not significant at the 95% confidence level.
Source: Author’s estimation.
table 10
Government capital expenditure multipliers in the alternative SVAR and STVAR 
model
output Private 
consumption
Private  
investment
sVaR blanchard and Perotti
Impact multiplier 0.47 0.12 -0.01
Cumulative multiplier (h=12) 1.20 0.04 -0.02
Cumulative multiplier (h=20) 0.95 0.41 -0.03
Peak multiplier (q) 0.47 (0) 0.12 (0) 0.00 (3)
stVaR – recession
Average multiplier (h=8) 2.50 1.40 0.61
Average multiplier (h=12) 2.23 1.26 0.42
Average multiplier (h=20) 1.83 1.03 0.20
STVAR – expansion
Average multiplier (h=8) 0.58 0.33 0.19
Average multiplier (h=12) 0.35 0.22 0.17
Average multiplier (h=20) 0.20 0.06 0.10
Note: Numbers in italic mean that the estimate is not significant at the 95% confidence level.
Source: Author’s estimation.a
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196 The results are similar and in line with the significance time horizon to those of 
Grdović Gnip (2013), where spending components were disaggregated into cur­
rent and capital in a five-variable Blanchard and Perotti SVAR approach.
5 concluding remarks
During the latest financial crisis a large number of countries and respective econo­
mic authorities opted for fiscal policy measures to boost economic activity. This 
paper investigates the effectiveness of fiscal multipliers on the Croatian case and 
shows that an expansionary fiscal policy during recessions could be a powerful 
stabilization tool. It is shown that in a regime-switch model the multipliers are 
much larger than in a no-regime switch approach. 
A one-kuna increase in government spending would lead to an increase in output 
of more than 2 kuna in the medium and long term in economic downturns. Accor­
ding to the SVAR approach a government spending of one kuna will on impact 
raise private consumption by four lipa, but in the long term the effect will be 1.22 
kuna. In contrast, an increase in taxes of one kuna will on impact decrease private 
consumption by just two lipa, but in the long term the decrement is about 46 lipa. 
If during recessions an increase in government spending of one kuna occurs, pri­
vate consumption will rise by 1.07 kuna on average per quarter during the first two 
years.
When investigating the possible trilemma concerning spending for purchases of 
goods and services, wages or capital goods, there are actually no doubts in times 
of recessions. That is, the effect of the shock in the purchase of goods and services 
is significant throughout the whole time horizon and a one kuna increase in this 
component will raise output, private consumption and private investment by 3.89, 
2.16 and 0.61 kuna respectively. 
Nevertheless, these results can be considered as indicative since there is a need to 
extend the research in two main directions. On the one hand the effects of different 
taxes (direct and indirect) in a regime-switching model should be investigated. 
The Croatian government made a number of discretionary changes (mainly with 
respect to taxes and not spending) during the latest recession (starting with the 
crisis tax, the VAT rate increment and so on), which according to the literature 
could not be considered as counter-cyclical. Since this research has shown that the 
effects of taxes (as well as spending) are larger and more significant in recessio-
nary times such government decisions may have deepened the recession (keeping 
in mind that nothing particularly “strong” has been done on the expenditure side 
of the budget to offset the effects of the tax measures). This may be one of the key 
issues why Croatia has experienced one of the longest recession periods amid EU 
countries. a
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197 On the other hand, no research in the field of fiscal multipliers based on the Croa­
tian case has so far provided information about the possible driving forces of fiscal 
multipliers such as indebtedness or openness to trade, either in linear or in non-
linear models. This extension would show the effect of particular economic fac­
tors on fiscal multipliers and would exhibit whether the magnitude of the multi­
pliers would change and in which direction. 
On top of that, it is important to point out that this paper uses consolidated central 
government data because consolidated general government data for Croatia are 
available only from 2004 onward. Using the latter data set would imply a short 
time-span, which could affect the power of test, and not only in the SVAR setup, 
but especially in the STVAR setup where the baseline already includes additional 
variables. Furthermore, encompassing just the period 2004-2012 would mean ha­
ving two additional limitations: (1) the data would embrace only one recession 
period and this could also affect the results, since it is better to have as many 
“jumps” between different states of the economy as possible, plus (2) the “only 
recession period” would be represented by the latest crisis, which comes at the end 
of the observation period meaning that there is (still) no registered switch (and or 
data set) to a following subsequent recovering/expansionary phase. 
Therefore, when the potential period under investigation involves a longer time 
series (and therefore a higher number of observations) not necessitating  particular 
assumptions that restrict the tests by possibly doing harm to the degrees of free­
dom, a non-linear approach at the general government level should be considered.   
This could make the results of fiscal policy effects more precise. Moreover, an 
extended observation sample would permit an “extended” baseline STVAR (or 
another regime switching) model by incorporating more endogenous or exoge­
nous variables, resulting in even more accurate estimations.a
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198 appendix a: data variables’ definition and sources
symbol name and description 
Y output
Definition:
Gross domestic product in real terms.
The series spans from 1995Q1–2011Q4.
Units: HRK, 2,000 reference prices
Source:
For the period 1994-1997 Mikulić and Lovrinčević (2000); for the period 
1998-2011 Croatian Bureau of Statistics’ Press Releases available at the 
Croatian Bureau of Statistics Official Web Page.
c Private consumption
Definition:
Private consumption in real terms.
The series spans from 1995Q1–2011Q4.
Units: HRK, 2,000 reference prices
Source:
For the period 1994-1997 Mikulić and Lovrinčević (2000); for the period 
1998-2011 Croatian Bureau of Statistics’ Press Releases available at the 
Croatian Bureau of Statistics Official Web Page.
I Investment
Definition:
Investment in real terms.
The series spans from 1995Q1–2011Q4.
Units: HRK, 2,000 reference prices
Source:
For the period 1994-1997 Mikulić and Lovrinčević (2000); for the period 
1998-2011 Croatian Bureau of Statistics’ Press Releases available at the 
Croatian Bureau of Statistics Official Web Page.
G Net government expenditure
Definition:
Government expenditure as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), i.e. total 
  purchases of goods and services plus capital spending at the central 
  government level in real terms. As in the referred work, this variable 
  expresses expenditure net of transfers.
Note: GFS 1986 was the official Croatian government finance statistics 
methodology until 2004, when the new IMF methodology, i.e. the GFS 
2001, was adopted. Since that would pose a structural break in the data, 
aggregated fiscal data for the period 2004-2011 were reclassified according 
to the GFS 1986 methodology (for details see Grdović Gnip, 2011:48, 67 
and its references).  
The series spans from 1996Q1–2011Q4.
Units: HRK, 2000 reference prices.
Source:
Statistical Reports of the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Croatia available 
at the Ministry of Finance Official Web Page. Author’s estimation.
R  Net taxes
Definition:
Net taxes in the sense of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), i.e. personal income 
tax plus corporate income tax plus indirect taxes plus social security contri­
butions minus transfers to persons and minus interest payments, in real 
terms. Still, transfers to persons are proxied by the unemployment related 
expenditure only due to the unavailability of the data for the period prior to 
year 2004. 
Note: GFS 1986 was the official Croatian government finance statistics 
methodology until 2004, when the new IMF’s methodology, i.e. the GFS 
2001 was adopted. Since that would pose a structural break in the data, 
aggregated fiscal data for the period 2004-2011 were reclassified according 
to the GFS 1986 methodology (for details see Grdović Gnip, 2011:48, 67 
and its references).  
The series spans from 1996Q1–2011Q4.a
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199 symbol name and description 
Units: HRK, 2,000 reference prices
Source:
Statistical Reports of the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Croatia available 
at the Ministry of Finance Official Web Page, and Ministry of Finance. 
Author’s estimation.
ecur_r Current expenditure
Definition:
Central government budget current expenditure in real terms.
The series spans the period from 1996Q1–2011Q4.
Units: HRK, 2,000 reference prices
Source:
Statistical Reports of the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Croatia available 
at the Ministry of Finance Official Web Page.
ecap_r Capital expenditure
Definition:
Central government budget capital expenditure in real terms. It is used as a 
proxy for public investment as well.
Note: Data for all expenditure subcategories, therefore capital expenditure 
as well, for the period from June 2003 to October 2003 are not available in 
the Statistical Reports of the Ministry of Finance on a monthly basis. Still, 
data of the sum between capital and current expenditures are available, so 
capital expenditure is obtained by subtracting current from total 
expenditure.   
The series spans the period from 1996Q1–2011Q4.
Units: HRK, 2,000 reference prices
Source:
Statistical Reports of the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Croatia available 
at the Ministry of Finance Official Web Page.
ewages_r Expenditure for wages 
Definition:
Current expenditure for gross wages and social contributions from the cen­
tral government budget in real terms. It is used as proxy for public em­
ployment.
Note: Data for all expenditure subcategories, therefore expenditure for 
employees as well, for the period from June 2003 to October 2003 are not 
available in the Statistical Reports of the Ministry of Finance on a monthly 
basis. Still, data of the cumulative sum of this expenditure for the period 
January-November 2003 are available. Available data from January to 
June were subtracted from the available cumulative sum, and then the mis-
sing data are obtained by interpolating the residue sum between the missing 
months using as a pattern the monthly growth rates of current expenditure. 
The series spans the period from 1997Q4–2011Q4.
Units: HRK, 2,000 reference prices
Source:
Statistical Reports of the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Croatia available 
at the Ministry of Finance Official Web Page.
epur_r Expenditure for purchases of goods and services
Definition:
Current expenditure for purchases of goods and services from the central 
government budget in real terms. It is used as proxy for public con­
sumption.
Note: Data for all expenditure subcategories, therefore expenditure for 
purchases of goods and services as well, for the period from June 2003 to 
October 2003 are not available in the Statistical Reports of the Ministry of 
Finance on a monthly basis. Still, data of the cumulative sum of this expen-
diture for the period January-November 2003 are available. Available data 
from January to June were subtracted from the available cumulative sum, 
and then the missing data are obtained by interpolating the residue sum 
between the missing months using as a pattern the monthly growth rates of 
current expenditure. 
The series spans the period from 1997Q4–2011Q4.a
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200 symbol name and description 
Units: HRK, 2,000 reference prices
Source:
Statistical Reports of the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Croatia available 
at the Ministry of Finance Official Web Page.
fegspend Unanticipated component in net government spending (ebr)
Definition:
Ratio between the outturn (realization) of net government spending and the 
one-quarter-ahead forecast (plan). 
Note: Planned values of net government spending are usually presented in 
the Croatian Official Gazette in December of year t for year t+1 (or excep-
tionally in January of year t+1 for year t+1) for the central budget level. 
Since forecast values of government spending are available on an annual 
basis only, interpolation is used to get a quarterly series and the procedure 
is based on quarterly growth rates of government spending outturn.
The series spans the period from 1995Q2–2011Q4.
Units: Ratio
Source:
Statistical Reports of the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Croatia available 
at the Ministry of Finance Official Web Page, and Ministry of Finance.  
Official gazette’s following numbers: NN 98/1994, 9/1996, 111/1996, 
141/1997, 167/1998, 33/2000, 130/2000, 116/2001, 154/2002, 31/2004, 
171/2004, 148/2005, 137/2006, 28/2008, 149/2008, 151/2010 and 
140/2011. Author’s estimation.
FEtaxes Unanticipated component in net taxes (Rbr)
Definition:
Ratio between the outturn (realization) of net taxes and the one-quarter-
ahead forecast (plan). 
Note: Planned values of taxes are usually presented in the Croatian Official 
gazette in December of year t for year t+1 (or exceptionally in January of 
year t+1 for year t+1) for the central budget level. Since forecast values of 
taxes are available on an annual basis only, interpolation is used to get a 
quarterly series and the procedure is based on quarterly growth rates of 
total taxes outturn.
The series spans the period from 1995Q2–2011Q4.
Units: Ratio
Source:
Statistical Reports of the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Croatia available 
at the Ministry of Finance Official Web Page, and Ministry of Finance.  
Official Gazette, the following numbers: NN 98/1994, 9/1996, 111/1996, 
141/1997, 167/1998, 33/2000, 130/2000, 116/2001, 154/2002, 31/2004, 
171/2004, 148/2005, 137/2006, 28/2008, 149/2008, 151/2010 and 
140/2011. Author’s estimation.
fecure Unanticipated component in current government spending (ecur)
Definition:
Ratio between the outturn (realization) of current government spending and 
the one-quarter-ahead forecast (plan). 
Note: Planned values of current government spending are usually presented 
in the Croatian Official gazette in December of year t for year t+1 (or 
exceptionally in January of year t+1 for year t+1) for the central budget 
level. Since forecast values of current government spending are available 
on an annual basis only, interpolation is used to get a quarterly series and 
the procedure is based on quarterly growth rates of current government 
spending outturn.
The series spans the period from 1995Q2–2011Q4.
Units: Ratioa
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201 symbol name and description 
Source:
Statistical Reports of the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Croatia available 
at the Ministry of Finance Official Web Page, and Ministry of Finance.  
Official Gazette, the following numbers: NN 98/1994, 9/1996, 111/1996, 
141/1997, 167/1998, 33/2000, 130/2000, 116/2001, 154/2002, 31/2004, 
171/2004, 148/2005, 137/2006, 28/2008, 149/2008, 151/2010 and 
140/2011. Author’s estimation.
fepure
Unanticipated component in government spending for purchases of goods 
and services (epur)
Definition:
Ratio between the outturn (realization) of expenditure for purchases of 
goods and services and the one-quarter-ahead forecast (plan). 
Note: Planned values of government spending for purchases of goods and 
services are usually presented in the Croatian Official gazette in December 
of year t for year t+1 (or exceptionally in January of year t+1 for year t+1) 
for the central budget level. Since forecast values are available on an an-
nual basis only, interpolation is used to get a quarterly series and the pro-
cedure is based on quarterly growth rates of government spending for pur-
chases of goods and services outturn.
The series spans the period from 1997Q4–2011Q4.
Units: Ratio
Source:
Statistical Reports of the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Croatia available 
at the Ministry of Finance Official Web Page, and Ministry of Finance.  
Official Gazette, the following numbers: NN 98/1994, 9/1996, 111/1996, 
141/1997, 167/1998, 33/2000, 130/2000, 116/2001, 154/2002, 31/2004, 
171/2004, 148/2005, 137/2006, 28/2008, 149/2008, 151/2010 and 
140/2011. Author’s estimation.
fewagese Unanticipated component in government spending for wages (ewages)
Definition:
Ratio between the outturn (realization) of expenditure for wages and the 
one-quarter-ahead forecast (plan). 
Note: Planned values of government spending for wages are usually pre-
sented in the Croatian Official gazette in December of year t for year t+1 
(or exceptionally in January of year t+1 for year t+1) for the central budget 
level. Since forecast values are available on an annual basis only, interpo-
lation is used to get a quarterly series and the procedure is based on quar-
terly growth rates of government spending for wages outturn.
The series spans the period from 1997Q4–2011Q4.
Units: Ratio
Source:
Statistical Reports of the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Croatia available 
at the Ministry of Finance Official Web Page, and Ministry of Finance.  
Official Gazette, the following numbers: NN 98/1994, 9/1996, 111/1996, 
141/1997, 167/1998, 33/2000, 130/2000, 116/2001, 154/2002, 31/2004, 
171/2004, 148/2005, 137/2006, 28/2008, 149/2008, 151/2010 and 
140/2011. Author’s estimation.
fecape Unanticipated component in capital government spending (ecap)
Definition:
Ratio between the outturn (realization) of capital expenditure and the one-
quarter-ahead forecast (plan). 
Note: Planned values of capital government spending are usually presented 
in the Croatian Official gazette in December of year t for year t+1 (or 
exceptionally in January of year t+1 for year t+1) for the central budget 
level. Since forecast values are available on an annual basis only, interpo-
lation is used to get a quarterly series and the procedure is based on quar-
terly growth rates of capital government spending outturn.
The series spans the period from 1995Q2–2011Q4.
Units: Ratioa
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202 symbol name and description 
Source:
Statistical Reports of the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Croatia available 
at the Ministry of Finance Official Web Page, and Ministry of Finance.  
Official gazette’s following numbers: NN 98/1994, 9/1996, 111/1996, 
141/1997, 167/1998, 33/2000, 130/2000, 116/2001, 154/2002, 31/2004, 
171/2004, 148/2005, 137/2006, 28/2008, 149/2008, 151/2010 and 
140/2011. Author’s estimation.a
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203 appendix b: exogenous elasticities
The exogenous elasticities of a budgetary item with respect to output are obtained 
as product of the elasticity of the budgetary item to its macroeconomic base and 
the elasticity of this base with respect to output. If the elasticity of a budgetary 
item is constructed as an average value of two or more sub-components’ elastici­
ties,  then  their respective shares  in  the  budgetary item’s  volume  are  used  as 
weights. To sum up, the tax elasticity to output is:
.  (B1)
Table B1 shows the elasticities of different tax components to their respective 
macrobase as well as the elasticity of the latter to output, plus the shares of tax 
components in total tax revenues. Similarly, table B2 reports the sub-elasticities 
used to estimate the overall elasticity of taxes with respect to private consumption 
and private investment.
table b1
Exogenous sub-elasticities with respect to real GDP and share of tax item in total 
taxes (baseline model)
budgetary item  elasticity of 
budgetary 
item to 
“macrobase”
elasticity of 
“macrobase” 
to real GDP
elasticity of 
budgetary 
item w.r.t. 
real GDP
share in total 
taxes
Personal income tax 1.77 0.49 0.87 0.126
Corporate income tax 3.62 0.33 1.19 0.048
Social security contributions 0.68 0.49 0.33 0.357
Indirect taxes 1.53 0.89 1.36 0.468
Note: For details on the respective “macrobase” (macroeconomic base) see for instance 
Bouthevillain et al. (2001). 
Source: Author’s calculation.a
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204 table b2
Exogenous sub-elasticities with respect to private consumption and investment 
budgetary item  elasticity of 
“macrobase” 
to private 
consumption
elasticity of 
“macrobase” 
to investment
elasticity of 
budgetary 
item w.r.t. 
private 
consumption
elasticity of 
budgetary 
item w.r.t. 
investment
Personal income tax 0.21 0.27 0.37 0.48
Corporate income tax 0.14 0.19 0.51 0.69
Social security contributions 0.21 0.27 0.14 0.18
Indirect taxes – 0.46 1.53 0.70
Note: For details on respective “macrobase” (macroeconomic base) see for instance Bouthevillain 
et al. (2001). All coefficients are significant at least at the 5% level.
Source: Author’s calculation.
The overall elasticities are presented in table B3. It is important to note that the 
overall total tax elasticity is 0.93, but since the fiscal variable regarding go­
vernment revenues used in the analysis is constructed following the assumptions 
of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), i.e. net of transfers, it is corrected by the elasti-
city of unemployment related expenditures to output weighted by the share of this 
expenditure in total government expenditure33.
table b3
Exogenous elasticities with respect to output 
budgetary item w.r.t. real output w.r.t. private 
consumption
w.r.t. private 
investment
Net taxes  0.92 0.84 0.49
Direct taxes  0.53 0.23 0.29
Indirect taxes  1.36 1.53 0.70
Government spending 0 0 0
Government spending for purchases 0 0 0
Government spending for wages 0 0 0
Government capital spending 0 0 0
Source: Author’s calculation regarding taxes and its components, and Perotti (2002) regarding 
spending and its components.
33 Following Grdović Gnip (2011) the output elasticity of unemployment-related expenditures is -0.58, and 
these expenditures amount to 0.85% of total central government expenditures, which allows for a -0.01 correc­
tion of the total tax elasticity, to obtain the output elasticity of net taxes.a
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205 appendix c: alternative models
svar approach
Alternative SVAR models represent a four-variable VAR model extended for an 
output component  , i.e. private investment or private consumption, placed third 
in the system34. Having four endogenous variables in the system means 22 restric­
tions in order to have the just-identified SVAR model:
.
  (C1)
Equation (C1) shows the matrix representation of an alternative SVAR model with 
20 restrictions out of the total needed 22. One more restriction comes out from the 
tax shock equation, since, in order to be able to formulate cyclically adjusted 
taxes, there is need for another exogenous elasticity, i.e. the elasticity of taxes with 
respect to the GDP component in question ( ). These elasticities are shown in 
table B3,   being the elasticity with respect to private consumption and   the 
elasticity with respect to private investment. 
The last restriction again comes out of the assumption whether government deci­
des first on taxes or spending. Since the results proved to be robust in the baseline 
model under the assumption that spending comes first in the Croatian case, all 
alternative models are in line with that choice and therefore again  . 
For example, the just-identified SVAR model extended for private consumption 
would be the following:
.
  (C2)
In the case when the effects of a particular sending component, like government 
expenditure for wages for instance, are under investigation, then the latter replaces 
the (total) government spending in the model ordered first. 
34 Recall Caldara and Kamps (2008) for a detailed insight into assumptions behind such ordering.a
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206 stvar approach
Alternative STVAR models represent a five-variable model (since in the baseline 
specification in comparison with SVAR models there is already an extra variable, 
i.e. the unanticipated component of the fiscal instrument) extended again for an 
output component  . If we again consider the example of the extended model for 
private consumption, then the response of the latter after a government spending 
shock would be an extension of equation (24) in the following way:
  (C3)
  a
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207 appendix d: smooth transition function
figure d1
Smooth transition function F(zt) with different values for λ
(a) Recession periods according to CBS
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(b) Recession periods according to Krznar (2011)
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Notes: On both figures the grey surface corresponds to recession periods. However, in panel (a) 
these periods correspond to the occurrence of two or more consecutive periods (quarters) of nega-
tive real GDP, while panel (b) shows recession periods as identified in Krznar (2011). It is impor-
tant to point out that in the latter case the last observation used in the estimation was 2010Q4. 
Source: Author’s estimation.a
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208 appendix e: impulse response functions
figure e1
Impulse responses of output after a spending and tax shock 
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Note: SVAR panels – dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. STVAR panels – grey sha-
dow area shows 95% confidence intervals in case of recession IRF, while dashed lines the same 
in case of expansion IRF. 
Source: Author’s estimation.
figure e2
Impulse responses of private consumption after a spending and tax shock 
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Note: SVAR panels – dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. STVAR panels – grey sha-
dow area shows 95% confidence intervals in case of recession IRF, while dashed lines the same 
in case of expansion IRF. 
Source: Author’s estimation.a
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209 figure e3
Impulse responses of private investment after a spending and tax shock 
Recession Expansion
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Note: SVAR panels – dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. STVAR panels – grey shadow 
area shows 95% confidence intervals in case of recession IRF, while dashed lines the same in 
case of expansion IRF.
Source: Author’s estimation.a
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210 figure e4
Impulse responses of output, private consumption and private investment, after   
a shock in government spending for purchases of goods and services 
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Note: SVAR panels – dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. STVAR panels – grey shadow 
area shows 95% confidence intervals in case of recession IRF, while dashed lines the same in 
case of expansion IRF. 
Source: Author’s estimation.a
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211 figure e5
Impulse responses of output, private consumption and private investment, after   
a shock in government spending for wages 
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Note: SVAR panels – dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. STVAR panels – grey sha-
dow area shows 95% confidence intervals in case of recession IRF, while dashed lines the same 
in case of expansion IRF. 
Source: Author’s estimation.a
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212 figure e6
Impulse responses of output, private consumption and private investment, after   
a shock in capital government spending 
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in case of expansion IRF. 
Source: Author’s estimation.a
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